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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 08-3601
___________
MARK ANTHONY LEWIS, 
                  Appellant
   v.
BELL ATLANTIC/VERIZON; BELL ATLANTIC/VERIZON, Affiliate Company
'Core'; SUE PETRAN; ABBY ELTZ; RON SMITH; CHRIS BERGY; DEBBIE
DIVANTANTONIO; MICHELLE DIVANTANTONIO; MARK MONSO; PETER
TURK;  JOY GROODY; BOB GROODY; DAN KELLY; CARL; LINDA O'BRIANT;
DAVE PASKOWLSKI; DENNIS GREENEY; JOE GIMALAIRO; JOHN NATOLI;
JAMIE MURRAY; GEORGE KEEFE; DANIEL J. WHELLAN; VERIZON
DIRECTORY GRAPHICS, INC.; IDEARC MEDIA SERVICES-EAST, INC.
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 02-CV-01016)
District Judge:  Honorable R. Barclay Surrick
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 14, 2009
Before: BARRY, SMITH and GARTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: April 14, 2009)
___________
OPINION
___________
      The complaint was dismissed as to the individual defendants named therein based on1
insufficiency of service of process.  Dist. Ct. Order, entered Dec. 20, 2002, dkt. #23.
      Both parties to the confrontation were sent home for the day, with pay, pending2
investigation.  Witnesses to the confrontation later indicated that Lewis was the aggressor.
      The incident with the coworker triggered an investigation into Lewis’s application. 3
In its letter offering employment, the employer informed Lewis that his employment was
contingent on a successful background check, which could also take place after his
employment began, and that the employer reserved the right to terminate him at any time
2
PER CURIAM
Mark Anthony Lewis appeals from an order of the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granting the defendant’s  motion for summary1
judgment in his civil action.  We will affirm.
Because the parties are familiar with the history and facts of the case, and because
the District Court’s memorandum contains a detailed account, we will recount the
background in summary fashion.  Lewis, an African American male, had been employed
by Bell Atlantic Directory Graphics (now “Idearc Media Services,” hereinafter “the
Employer”) as an advertisement compositor.  Lewis’s lawsuit alleged discrimination
based essentially on three incidents.  First, he noted that he was suspended in 1998 for
misusing company time.  However, the suspension was withdrawn, the incident was
purged from his personnel file, and he was reinstated with back pay.  Second, Lewis was
suspended in February 1999 for having a verbal confrontation with a coworker,  and for2
falsifying his employment application to indicate that he had graduated from high school
when he had not.   Although the Employer intended to terminate Lewis, his union3
based on the background check.
      In July of 1999, Lewis filed an internal complaint stating that his 1998 and 19994
suspensions were the result of disparate treatment based on his race.  The Employer hired
an outside firm to investigate his claims.  The firm found no evidence of racial
discrimination or disparate treatment, and noted, inter alia, that between 1997 and 1998,
the Employer had terminated four white employees for lying on their employment
applications, while Lewis had been allowed to keep his job.
      Lewis had informed the Employer’s short-term disability provider that he had been5
absent from work from January 24, 2000 until February 4, 2000.  The disability provider
paid short-term disability payments based on information provided by Lewis, even
though, in actuality, he was not absent and was receiving regular pay from the Employer
for that period.  The Employer also found that Lewis had submitted a time sheet showing
that he worked over seven hours on March 14, 2000, when he had only worked about
one-half hour on that date.  A manager corrected the time sheet to reflect the amount of
time Lewis was actually at work before it was submitted.
3
negotiated a “last chance agreement” in lieu of termination, and Lewis returned to work
in March 1999.   The third incident Lewis’s complaint relies on is his termination on4
March 27, 2000 for false reporting of time records and fraudulent receipt of short-term
disability funds.5
Lewis filed a grievance with his union regarding his termination.  Following
proceedings, a Board of Arbitration found that the Employer had just cause to terminate
Lewis.  Lewis filed a charge of discrimination against the Employer with the United
States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and received a right to sue letter on
November 30, 2001.  Lewis filed the complaint sub judice in February 2002.  Following
discovery, the District Court granted the Employer’s motion for summary judgment,
finding that Lewis had failed to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination
4based on the three incidents noted above.  Lewis filed a timely notice of appeal of this
decision.  He also challenges the District Court’s decision not to recuse upon his motion,
and the District Court’s rulings on his other motions.
We have jurisdiction over the appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary
review over the District Court’s decision to grant summary judgment.  McGreevy v.
Stoup, 413 F.3d 359, 363 (3d Cir. 2005).  Summary judgment is appropriate when the
“pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).  A court reviewing a summary
judgment motion must evaluate the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.  Brewer v. Quaker State Oil
Ref. Corp., 72 F.3d 326, 330 (3d Cir. 1995).  However, a party opposing summary
judgment “must present more than just ‘bare assertions, conclusory allegations or
suspicions’ to show the existence of a genuine issue.”  Podobnik v. U.S. Postal Serv., 409
F.3d 584, 594 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325
(1986)).
As Lewis did not submit direct evidence of discriminatory behavior, the District
Court appropriately analyzed his discrimination claims under the familiar burden-shifting
framework established by McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).  Under that
framework, a plaintiff challenging an adverse employment decision has the initial burden
5of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination.  See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at
802.  To set forth a prima facie case of disparate treatment a plaintiff must show that: “(1)
s/he is a member of a protected class; (2) s/he was qualified for the position s/he sought to
attain or retain; (3) s/he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the action
occurred under circumstances that could give rise to an inference of intentional
discrimination.”  Makky v. Chertoff, 541 F.3d 205, 214 (3d Cir. 2008).  The burden then
shifts to the employer to proffer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse
action.  McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.  Once that burden is met, the plaintiff must
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the nondiscriminatory reasons
articulated by the employer are pretextual.  See Jones v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 198
F.3d 403, 410 (3d Cir. 1999).  To defeat summary judgment, “the plaintiff must point to
some evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which a factfinder could reasonably either
(1) disbelieve the employer’s articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an
invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative
cause of the employer’s action.”  Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994).  
We conclude that the District Court’s analysis and entry of summary judgment on
Lewis’s discrimination claim is fully supported by the record.  We agree with the District
Court that Lewis did not meet his prima facie case of showing discrimination against him
on account of his race, and, even assuming he did meet that burden, the Employer
terminated him for legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons.  See Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 763
6(noting that the employer’s burden to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason is
“relatively light”).
We agree with the District Court that Lewis’s suspension in 1998 was not an
adverse employment action, as he was reinstated with back pay and the incident was
expunged from his record.  We further agree that Lewis has not pointed to any evidence
in the record that would allow a factfinder to infer that his 1999 suspension had anything
to do with his race.  To the contrary, the record shows that several white employees were
fired for lying on their employment applications, while Lewis was given another chance
on the job.  Finally, we agree that Lewis presented no evidence to show that his
termination was racially motivated.  The District Court also properly found that even if
Lewis had established a prima facie case, the Employer presented legitimate, non-
discriminatory reasons for terminating him; i.e., attempting to submit a false time sheet,
and collecting short-term disability benefits and wages at the same time.  After thoroughly
reviewing the record, we conclude that the District Court properly determined that Lewis
did not demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact with regard to his
discrimination claim.  
Lewis contends that the District Court erred in failing to recuse upon his motion.
We review a judge’s decision not to recuse, under either 28 U.S.C. § 144 or § 455, for an
abuse of discretion.  See Jones v. Pittsburgh Nat’l Corp., 899 F.2d 1350, 1356 (3d Cir.
1990).  Under section 144, a judge must recuse if a party files a “sufficient affidavit”
7establishing that the judge has a personal bias or prejudice against the party seeking
recusal, or in favor of the adverse party.  28 U.S.C. § 144.  Under section 455, a judge
must recuse where the judge’s impartiality “might reasonably be questioned.”  28 U.S.C.  
§ 455(a).  Lewis cites various rulings of the District Court that were unfavorable to him as
evidence that the District Court harbored a preconceived unfavorable judgment about
him.  Unfavorable rulings do not form an adequate basis for recusal.  See SecuraComm
Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2000).  Moreover, we find
nothing in the record that suggests “a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism” by the
District Court that would preclude fair judgment.  Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540,
555 (1994).  Nor do we perceive any facts from which a reasonable person would
conclude that the impartiality of the District Court might reasonably be questioned.  See
28 U.S.C. § 455(a); Edelstein v. Wilentz, 812 F.2d 128, 131 (3d Cir. 1987).  We discern
no abuse of the District Court’s discretion in the denial of Lewis’s recusal motion.  
We further find no evidence of bias and no abuse of discretion in the District
Court’s rulings on Lewis’s other motions, including his discovery motions.  See Lloyd v.
Hovensa, LLC, 369 F.3d 263, 274-75 (3d Cir. 2004) (scope and conduct of discovery
within sound discretion of trial court; appeals court reviews only for abuse of discretion). 
We find no record support for Lewis’s claim that the Employer perpetrated a fraud on the
Court.
      Lewis’s motion to file attachments as evidence and disk containing attachments is6
granted to the extent the documents were a part of the District Court record.  This Court
“cannot consider material on appeal that is outside of the district court record.”
In re Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.'s Application for Access to Sealed Transcripts, 913 F.2d
89, 96 (3d Cir. 1990).
8
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.6
